Repensando la Primera Vía de Santo Tomás de Aquino
Palabras clave:
tomismo, prueba, Dios, metafísica, movimientoResumen
El objetivo del presente artículo es doble: a) Examinar la eficacia probatoria de la primera vía de Santo Tomás de Aquino para probar la existencia de Dios desde un marco metafísico, presentando una interpretación renovada y coherente con el texto original. Consecuentemente: b) afrontar el problema de la unificación de diversas cadenas de movimiento, según Anthony Kenny.
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Derechos de autor 2026 Renzo Rodrigo de la Quintana Béjar
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
